Is human capital an asset? We empirically address this question using the accounting concept of assets -costs should be capitalized as assets if they are expected to generate future measurable benefits with reasonable certainty. Also, holding the investment opportunity set constant, disposal of these assets should lead to a reduction in future benefits. The analysis concentrates on the UK football industry, as it represents a case where human capital is highly significant, data on investment in human capital is available, and where investment in human capital is significant due to restrictions on labor mobility. Using a sample of 58 football clubs during 1990-2000, we examine the relation between measures of benefits that accrue to the firm on one hand and current and lagged transfer fees paid for new players and transfer fees received from selling players on the other hand. Results suggest that certain measures of future benefits are positively (negatively) associated with current and lagged transfer fees paid (received). That is, investing in human capital is capable of increasing future benefits and selling it may reduce them. Also, regression analysis demonstrates that the explanatory power of old investments is lower than that of more recent ones, consistent with the notion of amortization. Additional tests demonstrate the reliability of future sales but indicate uncertainty of other future benefits. Market values are positively (negatively) associated with transfer fees paid (received), suggesting that equity investors, on average, associate investments in players' contracts with future benefits.
Introduction
In an attempt to explain the steady increase in market-to-book ratios, accounting researchers have directed much attention to the valuation of investment in research and development activities.
However, relatively little is known about the valuation, measurement and reporting of human capital.
This could be explained by the complexity of the issue. For example, ownership of human capital cannot be enforced because employees are free to leave at will. Also, investment in human capital involves a great degree of uncertainty about the financial and operational success of those activities.
The traditional treatment of all expenditures on human capital (e.g., training, wages and signing bonus) is thus to uniformly expense them immediately.
In this paper, we empirically address a fundamental question: can investments in human capital be regarded as an asset in the financial statement? Our analysis utilizes the accounting concept of assets to answer this question. In particular, costs should be capitalized as assets on the balance sheet if they are expected to generate probable future benefits, these benefits are measurable and the entity has control over the associated benefits. Analogously, disposal of useful assets from the balance sheet, while holding the investment opportunity set constant, should be negatively associated with future benefits. Thus, our investigation primarily focuses on the relation between investments in human capital and future benefits.
To facilitate any useful empirical investigation, one would like to design a laboratory experiment in which the economic forces of interest are sufficiently powerful and the occurrence of confounding effects is relatively low. Thus, our aim has been to identify an industry where human capital is the most significant revenue driver available to the company. We believe that incorporated professional football clubs in the UK represent such an industry.
As a result of the specific legal institutions that regulate transfers of players between clubs, the football industry involves a significant degree of labor immobility. As discussed later in the paper, this suggests that this particular environment may be very conducive to investment in human capital and therefore offer prime opportunity to explore the basic recognition question. Another advantageous feature of this industry is that a considerable amount of information is disclosed about the cost of football clubs' most valuable asset, namely the players. UK Football clubs report information about transfer fees for contracted players (paid and received), sign-on bonuses, number of players and ordinary salaries of employees. In short, these characteristics of the football industry provide an interesting and relevant laboratory for an investigation of issues related to accounting for human capital.
Our main analysis utilizes three measures of benefits that may accrue to a professional football club as a result of investing in player contracts: sales, operating profit and league position.
Using a sample of 58 football clubs during 1990-2000, we examine the relation between these measures on one hand and proxies for current and past investments in, and divestments of, human capital on the other hand. The proxies for investments and divestments are current and lagged transfer fees paid for new players and transfer fees received from selling players, respectively. The validity of the transfer fee variables as a proxy for investment in human capital in other industries is predicated on the notion that transfer fees paid represent an attempt by football clubs to enhance the productivity of their workforce, whereas transfer fees received correspond to a departure of talented employees, which, with no further action, might adversely affect the firm's performance.
We show that the association between current sales, operating profits and league position and current and prior year's transfer fees paid is positive, whereas the association with current and prior year's transfer fees received is negative. Also, the association between current benefits and old investments or disposals is lower in magnitude and statistical significance than recent investments and disposals. These results are obtained after controlling for the possibility that transactions in player contracts are driven by the effects of cash resources. Market-based analysis of a subsample of listed companies demonstrates that market values are positively (negatively) associated with transfer fees paid (received). Furthermore, the transfer fee variables have incremental explanatory power above that of book value of equity and net profit before transfer fees, suggesting that investors, on average, associate investments in players' contracts with future benefits.
However, this analysis does not speak directly at the length of period during which such benefits will accrue to the firm. Overall, these results are consistent with capitalization of transfer fees as balance sheet assets, since their useful life extends beyond one year. However, given the large rate of decline in explanatory power of investments and disposals over time and the relatively short life span of these assets, full expensing of transfer fees cannot be ruled out in certain cases.
The evidence reported above suggests that information about investment in human capital may be useful to investors and potentially capable of being accounted for as an asset. However, an answer to the question of whether investment in human capital should be capitalized would be incomplete without reference to the reliability problem. We therefore also examine whether investing in player contracts generates future benefits with high likelihood. It is shown that positive (negative) net transfer fees are often followed by increases (decreases) in either sales or operating profit over a period of up to two years. The analysis also shows that the likelihood of an increase (decrease) in sales following positive (negative) net transfer fees is higher than the corresponding likelihood for operating profits. A potential explanation for this is that a large number of clubs pay players wages that are close to their marginal revenue product. On the whole, with perhaps the exception of future sales, this analysis seems to indicate that investment in human capital is susceptible to the reliability problem and that the uncertainty of future benefits increases with time.
Until December 1998, when capitalization of transfer fees became mandatory, football clubs enjoyed flexibility in their accounting treatment of transfer fees. While immediate expensing used to be managers' favorite method, we find that publicly listed clubs tended to capitalize transfer fees to a much larger extent than unlisted clubs. Examining the reliability of voluntary capitalization, we show that future sales are more reliable for listed (and capitalizing) clubs than for private (and expensing) clubs. However, for operating profits and league position the reliability measures are quite similar across these categories. This can be explained by listed companies putting greater weight on financial consequences of investment decisions than non-listed companies. The higher reliability scores for capitalizing firms indicate that the accounting decision may be based on managers' assessment of the likelihood of certain future benefits (e.g., sales) rather than being solely driven by other considerations. This suggests that mandating capitalization of investments in human capital, rather than making it optional, may be unwarranted.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews related literature.
Section 3 provides institutional background on UK football, details on players' transfers and information on accounting methods used. In Section 4, we discuss the sample and data and provide some descriptive statistics. In section 5, we estimate the association between transfer fees and future benefits and between transfer fees and market-based measures. In section 6, we review the accounting choices made by sample firms regarding transfer fees. Section 7 provides conclusions and suggestions for further research.
Related Literature
Of the few studies that focus on accounting for human capital notable examples include Lev and Schwartz (1971), Flamholtz (1971) , Morse (1973) and Friedman and Lev (1974) . While each of these studies proposes a different valuation procedure for human capital, they all agree that the value of human capital should be reflected in the financial statements. These studies also argue that information on human capital could be useful to investors in assessing efficiency and predicting future profitability and productivity. 1 Our study concentrates on a more basic problem by investigating whether certain expenditures on human capital can be viewed as assets. In fact, our study is motivated by Flamholtz (1999, p. 33), who states: "Thus the real issue is: Should investments in people be treated as assets?"
It has been argued that investments in human capital cannot be capitalized because companies cannot force employees to provide services, consistent with the legal notion of free labor mobility. Yet, labor mobility may be restricted due to various factors, such as g eographical preferences, search and relocation costs, information asymmetry, age and gender. 2 In addition, companies utilize a wide range of schemes to reduce employee turnover. 3 Attempting to explain the large sums spent by companies on a wide variety of training programs, labor economics literature has suggested that the presence of such restrictions and schemes would support investments in human capital (e.g., on-the-job training, apprenticeship schemes, executive education and similar 1 Studies that concern accounting for deferred labor costs include Barth, Beaver and Landsman (1992), Amir (1993) and Mittelsdaedt and Regier (1993) . 2 Hall (1982) reports that a typical US worker in the 1980s was in a job about eight years and a large fraction of the work force take on jobs that would last 20 years or more. This implies that while employees have the option to leave at any point in time, they do not exercise this option frequently. 3 Lazear (1979) points out that the tendency of pay to increase with age and experience incrementally to gains in productivity is a mechanism that helps not only to increase employee retention, but also reduce shirking. In addition, many companies use bonding techniques whereby a departing employee has to pay a fine intended to cover training costs. Milgrom and Roberts (1992, p. 189) , in reference to Levin (1989) , observe that during the 1970s Electronic Data Systems Corporation required trainees, who resigned within three years of joining the firm to pay the firm $12,000, an amount comparable to an engineer's annual salary at the time. programs). 4 This i s because when employee retention rate is high, the fruits of the investment are likely to be borne by the firm. 5 In the football industry, labor mobility of players is restricted by enforceable contractual arrangements, which, in turn, give rise to investment in human capital. Nevertheless, investments in player contracts, like investments in training and similar activities, aim at increasing a firm's performance. Therefore, the conclusions of this study may be useful for the debate on the appropriate accounting treatment for investments in human capital.
Another strand of relevant literature encompasses studies on UK football clubs. Szymanski and Kuypers (1997) examine the link between profits and league position and find no contemporaneous correlation. This is also the case for the association between league position in a given year with profits in the following year and for the association between profits in a given year with league position in the following year. However, there appears to be a positive correlation between change in division and change in profits. Szymanski and Kuypers (1997) also provide evidence that clubs with loss before tax tend to report net transfer income, whereas clubs with pretax profits tend to report net transfer expenditure. In contrast, we establish the link between players' transfers, as the main value driver in professional football, and future sales, operating profits and league position.
Institutional and Accounting Background

The market for football players
4 Bartel (1989) estimates that $55 billion was spent on firm-provided training in 1987. 5 Becker (1962 Becker ( , 1964 explains why companies would invest in firm-specific training programs. Rationale for firmfunded investments in general, non-firm-specific, training programs is provided in Acemoglu (1997), Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) and Revsine (1976, 1980) .
The purpose of the transfer market in European football is to facilitate and control the flow of players from one team to another. The purchase of a player in the transfer market is a form of investment. The size of the transfer price should be related to the expected flow of revenues from the player, similar to other fixed assets. Similar to fixed assets, a player's contribution to the firm's revenue generating process will decline at some point.
There are two types of player transfers. Transfers of players under contract and transfers of players outside contract. Until 1995, when a player's contract expired, the player could independently negotiate a contract with another club. The holding club must then offer the player terms, which are at least as good as those in the final year of his expired contract. If the holding club fails to offer those terms, the player is entitled to a free transfer. However, if the holding club offers terms that are rejected by the player, a transfer fee must be negotiated between the holding club and the club making the offer. If negotiations fail, the negotiating parties must enter an arbitration process controlled by the football association.
In December 1995, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in the case of "Bosman" ruled that restricting the transfer of players outside contracts is contrary to the provisions of the European Economic Community (EEC), and therefore void. Following the "Bosman" ruling, players outside contracts can move freely from one team to another provided both teams reside within the EEC (Antonioni and Cubbin 1997). All transfers of players whose contracts are still effective must be arranged directly by the clubs. An agreed transfer will typically involve a payment from the buying club to the holding club with the player himself receiving about 10% of the transfer fee. A club may also agree to loan a player to another club for a limited period for a loan fee. 
Accounting Background
Other than its ground and facilities, a football club's players are often i ts only productive assets. "An intangible asset should be recognized if, and only if: (a) it is probable that the future economic benefits that are attributable to the asset will flow to the enterprise; and (b) the cost of the asset can be measured reliably." Flamholtz (1999) posits that to be recognized as an asset, the cost of investment in human capital has to meet the following conditions: (1) an asset must possess a potential for future benefits; (2) benefits must be measured in monetary term; (3) these future benefits are owned or controlled by the reporting entity. The definition of future benefits includes a direct or indirect contribution to future net cash flows, subsequent sales, earnings, or share of industry sales, and revenues or cost saving.
Restrictions on labor mobility in the football industry imply that the third condition is satisfied.
Moreover, the idea of control over future benefits (not necessarily ownership) is used in purchase and lease accounting and can be extended to the services of employees in general and football players in particular. The second criterion is general and its application to investment in human capital is not any different than for other assets. That leaves us with the question, whether investments in players' transfers produce future benefits with high likelihood. This is the empirical question that is at the heart of our study. 7 These criteria notwithstanding, the treatment of transfer fees by UK football clubs has not been uniform until the issuance of Financial Reporting Standard No. 10 in the UK, which became effective in December 1998. This standard governs accounting treatment of intangible assets and requires that all purchased intangibles shall be identified and capitalized separately from goodwill. In addition, the standard requires that all intangibles shall be amortized over their useful lives. Finally, intangibles with useful lives of less than 20 years must be reviewed for impairment one year after their acquisition.
We identified three methods used by various UK football companies prior to FRS 10. 8 The first method is based on capitalization and amortization of purchased contracts as intangible fixed assets. The recognition and amortization of assets is usually based on historical cost and the term of the contract, respectively. Gains and losses from sale of players' registration are treated as capital gains similar to the sale of fixed assets. 9 The second method is based on full expensing of players' transfer fees. Under this method, purchased contracts are not recognized as assets on the balance sheet; rather, these contracts are fully expensed in the year the contracts are signed. When players' registration is sold to another team, revenues are recognized and reported separately.
The third, and relative rare, method is based on fair value accounting. Under this method, the company revalues registered players every period without amortizing the assets. Differences from revaluation are presented in the shareholders' equity account until the registration is sold. Only then, gains and losses are recognized.
Sample Selection, Data Sources and Descriptive Statistics
There The list of sample firms appears in Note that 13 out of the 24 listed companies had an IPO during or after 1995. In addition, there are relatively more listed firms in the top half of the table than at the bottom half. The last two columns report which method had been used by each firm during the sample period to account for players' transfer fees. In the period prior to 1999, most firms expensed transfer fees, however, the frequency of capitalizing transfer fees appears to be higher in publicly listed companies.
( Table 1 about here) Table 2 presents information on key financial variables by fiscal year for the entire sample The table also indicates that many football companies report net losses in their annual income statements. In addition, reported profit margins are generally higher for listed clubs than unlisted clubs, though in most years they also report losses. In summary, Table 2 indicates that listed companies are larger, more profitable, generate more cash flow from operations and spend more on acquisition of player contracts, but relatively less on wages.
( Table 2 about here) Turning to the lower panel of the table, it is clear that higher league teams spend relatively less on wages than lower league teams. In contrast, the cost of using fixed assets (depreciation plus lease expenses) is quite similar across leagues. Also, net transfers as a percentage of sales (PGAIN) are negatively correlated with league membership (e.g., -17% for premier league teams and +13% for division 3 teams). This result highlights two distinct strategies used by UK football companies for utilizing talent: large companies seem to heavily invest in player contracts to maintain league position whereas smaller companies seem to trade in players to sustain their financial viability, which comes at a cost of staying in a lower league. However, the cost of maintaining players on the roster is relatively lower for teams in higher leagues.
( Table 3 about here)
The Association between Transfer Fees and Future Benefits
We begin this section by first analyzing the determinants of current period's investment decision. We postulate that current investments in players' contracts, scaled by sales (DTFINV t ), are explained by management's past investments in players' contracts (DTFINV t-1 and t-2 ), current and lagged revenues from selling players scaled by sales (DTFREV t, t-1 and t-2 ), current cash from operations before transfer fees and team's stature (proxied by prior year's league position).
Results in Table 4 suggest that current cash resources (i.e., CFO before transfer fees and current year's revenues from selling players) stimulate expenditures on player contracts. This supports the notion that cash availability affects investment decision. However, prior year's expenditure and league position also provide incremental explanatory power, suggesting that broad strategic considerations regarding player mix and brand name also play an important role in this decision.
The results also suggest that investments in new players are largely funded by selling players and not by generating cash from operations. In particular, about half of such revenues serve as a source of cash for buying new players (coefficient of 0.45, t = 9.33), whereas only 0.19 (t = 5.26) of the cash from operations is directly linked to investments in new players. Past revenues from selling player contracts, however, do not seem to affect current year's investment decision. This is presumably because past revenues were already used to fund past acquisitions.
( Table 4 about here)
Next, we examine whether investments in (income from ) transfer fees are associated with increase (decrease) in future benefits. We measure financial benefits in terms of sales growth (DSALES t ) and in terms of operating profit (OPROF t ). In addition, league position is used as nonfinancial performance measure of benefits that accrue to a football team (ACLP t ). The rationale behind league position as a value measure is that football teams' value depends on their success on the pitch. 11 Another reason for including this variable is that players' motivation to change clubs may be influenced by their holding club's success in the league. We construct the following regression model:
BENEFIT it = α 0 + α 1 PUBLIC it + α 2 DWAGES it + α 3 DTAS it + α 4 DTFREV it + α 5 DTFREV it-1 + α 6 DTFREV it-2 + α 7 DTFINV it + α 8 DTFINV it-1 + α 9 DTFINV it-2 + α 10 ACLP it-1 + α 11 DACFO it + ε it (
Where BENEFIT it is one of the following three measures: (a) DSALES it , (b) OPROF it , and (c)
ACLP it . DSALES it is measured as firm i's current sales divided by lagged sales, OPROF it is equal to sales minus wages and other operating expenses (excluding transfers) divided by lagged sales. DWAGES it denotes total current wages divided by lagged sales and it is included since it proxies for the quality of the club's squad. Clubs with better players are expected to generate higher future benefits (e.g., higher sales growth and better league position). Since fixed assets also contribute to the generation of future benefits, we include DTAS it , total tangible assets as reported on the balance sheet (excluding capitalized intangibles) divided by lagged sales, as an explanatory variable. DTFREV it is revenues from selling players deflated by lagged sales. DTFINV it is transfer fees paid deflated by lagged sales. ACLP it-1 is included on the right hand-side of the equation as a measure of a club's recent success, as this is a measure of brand recognition and crowd-pulling ability. Given the results in Table 4 , the availability of cash flow from operations is likely to be Nevertheless, many companies report operating losses. Investments in new players are a large portion of sales (median = 30%). Similarly, median revenues from selling players as a percentage of sales are 25%. The Spearman correlation between investments in new players and all the three benefit measures is positive, whereas the Spearman correlation between revenues from selling players and the three benefit measures is negative. This analysis demonstrates the contemporaneous relation between investment in players and benefits that accrue to the clubs.
( Table 5 about here) Turning to regression analysis, table 6 provides results of estimating equation (1) with three different dependent variables. When DSALES it is the dependent variable, the coefficients on current, first and second lag of investments in players are positive and significant at the 0.05 level. In addition, the coefficients on current and lagged cash received from selling players are negative and significant at the 0.01 level. These findings suggest that investing in players' transfers is likely to result in an increase in sales in the current period and in the following two periods, whereas disposal of players is likely to reduce sales in the current and next period.
When operating profit (OPROF it ) is the dependent variable, the results are similar. The coefficients on DTFREV it and DTFREV it-1 are -0.23 and -0.15, respectively, significant at the 0.01 level. The coefficients on DTFINV it and on DTFINV it-1 are 0.25 and 0.14, respectively, also significant at the 0.01 level. However, the coefficients on the second lag are not statistically significant from zero suggesting that the useful life of investments in players is quite limited.
Nevertheless, these findings suggest that investing in (disposal of) players is likely to increase (decrease) operating profits in the current and next period. In addition, these results support the claim that investments in players are recoverable in a sense that they are likely to generate sufficient sales in order to cover wage and other operating expenses. Therefore, the full amount paid in transfer fee can be capitalized with no need for a write-down.
When league position is used as a dependent variable, the coefficients on DTFINV it , DTFINV it-1 and DTFINV it-2 are positive and significant at the 0.05 level, as expected. However, only the coefficient on DTFREV it is negative and significant at the 0.01 level, whereas the coefficients on the lags are not statistically different from zero.
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Taken together, the results suggest that the useful life of investments in transfers extends beyond one fiscal year, an observation, which supports balance sheet recognition. However, the large decrease in the absolute value of the coefficients indicates that capitalization of such expenditures should be followed by either fast amortization or frequent impairment tests.
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( 12 Estimating eq. (1) with fixed year and firm effects had little effect on the results when operating profits and league position were used as dependent variables. It had a more visible effect on estimating eq. (1) when sales were used as a dependent variable. However, all the results are qualitatively the same, although statistical inferences are somewhat weaker. In addition, we estimated eq. (1) with cash from operations before transfers (CFO) as a dependent variable. We find no association between CFO and prior investments in and divestment of players' transfers. 13 Lau and Lau (1978) argue that "[a] major objection against capitalizing recruitment costs as acquisitions costs is that the "service life" of the acquired HR assets is too uncertain. However, even for a conventional asset legally owned, such as a purchased truck, there is also uncertainty attached to its service life…Since uncertainties exist in the service lives of conventional assets as well as HR assets, the existence of uncertainty itself cannot justify the complete write-off of recruiting costs as expenditures."
MV3 it = β 0 + β 1 ABVE it + β 2 ANETINC it + β 3 ACLP it + β 3 TFINV it + β 4 TFREV it + ω it , 
In equation (2), a standard undeflated valuation model, MV3 denotes market value of equity three months after fiscal year-end, ABVE denotes book value of equity adjusted for capitalized transfer fees, ANETINC denotes net income before any effect of transfers, TFINV denotes investments in transfer fees and TFREV denotes transfer fees received. A negative coefficient on TFREV and a positive coefficient on TFINV will support the capitalization argument. In addition,
we expect β 1 , β 2 and β 3 to be positive because, ceteris paribus, higher book value, higher earnings and better league position should translate into larger market value of equity.
We also use a sales-deflated model, equation (3), where the dependent variable is MTS, measured as market value of equity three months after fiscal year-end divided by lagged sales. In this model we examine the role of physical assets and wage expenses in explaining the market-tosales ratio. The advantage of this variable is that it avoids deflating by book value of equity, which is frequently negative in the sample period and is also influenced by the accounting method used to record investment in transfer fees. As before, a negative coefficient on DTFREV and a positive coefficient on DTFINV will support the capitalization argument.
In addition, we expect β 1 to be negative because, ceteris paribus, more expensive players (higher wages) will reduce the market value of equity. We also expect β 2 to be positive because, additional pound of physical assets (e.g., investment undertaken to increase stadium capacity) is expected to increase the value of the firm.
In panel A of table 7 we provide the results of estimating eq. (2) . Notice the reduced sample size, as only 24 firms were listed for some period of time during 1990-00. First we regress market value of equity on adjusted book value of equity and adjusted earnings. While the coefficient on book value of equity is positive and highly significant (4.68, t = 13.06), the coefficient on earnings is negative and insignificant (-0.21, t = -0.22). Next, we add league position (ACLP), investments in transfer fees (TFINV) and cash received from disposal of players (TFREV) as additional explanatory variables. Now, the coefficients on book value of equity and on adjusted earnings are both positive and significant. Furthermore, the coefficient on TFINV and on TFREV are 5.69 and -5.57, respectively, both significant at the 0.01 level, which is consistent with the claim that investments in transfers are perceived by investors to increase future benefits. suggesting that a contribution of another pound invested in property, plant and equipment, holding outlays on players (i.e., wages and transfer fees) constant, will yield less than one pound in value.
Finally, the coefficient on DWAGES is negative (-1.13, t = -1.61), as expected. This is because holding the investment in players and physical assets constant, higher wages reduce market values.
To summarize, the results in table 7 reinforce those in Table 6 and indicate that investors regard investment in player contracts as an asset rather than current year's expenditure.
( Table 7 about here)
The previous tests indicate that current and lagged investments in transfer fees are, on average, associated with future benefits, such as sales, operating profits, and league position.
Market values of equity and market-to-sales ratios also exhibit positive (negative) relations with investments in (disposal of) players' transfers. However, these results, based on average magnitudes, do not directly speak to the likelihood that economic benefits will flow to the enterprise from transfer fees. The fundamental recognition criterion that has not yet been tackled is: Are these future benefits probable?
One statistical measure of reliability is given by the t-statistic on the regression coefficients.
Furthermore, since there is little debate on whether tangible assets should be recognized as assets, it is possible to use the strength of the association between future benefits and tangible assets as a benchmark. The analysis in Panel B of Table 7 reveals that the t-statistic on tangible assets is 5.26, whereas the t-statistics on transfer fees is 2.30. The natural interpretation is that the likelihood of future cash flows generated by tangible assets is higher than the likelihood of obtaining future cash flows from players, holding the other constant. Table 6 , however, suggests the opposite -the association between transfer fees and future benefits is much stronger than the association between tangible assets and future benefits. The question of reliability remains therefore open.
To address the issue of reliability directly, we calculate the ex-post frequency that a positive (negative) net investment in transfer fees is followed by an increase (decrease) in current and future benefits, where net investment is calculated as investments in transfer fees (TFINV) minus revenues from selling players (TFREV). Specifically, we calculate nine probability measures across three lags per each benefit variable (sales, operating profit and league position). The first variable (F1) shows the frequency that the sign of the net investment in players is identical to the sign of the change in current sales. The results suggest that in 65% of the cases, investments in players and current sales move in the same direction. In 71% of the cases, investments in players made in the previous period move in the same direction as current sales, significantly above 50% at the 0.01 level. However, in only 54% of the cases, investments in players made two periods ago move in the same direction as current sales.
Note that these frequencies are larger for listed companies than for unlisted ones. For example, in 63% of the cases, investments in players made two periods ago move in the same direction as current sales. This suggests that the investment in human capital decision in listed companies is more closely related to financial considerations. Furthermore, the frequencies are almost equal or larger for companies that capitalize transfer fees than for expensing firms. For example, while in expensing companies current sales and two-year lagged investments move in the same direction in only 58% of the cases, in capitalizing companies this phenomenon occurs in 74%
of the cases (significant at the 5% level). This last result is interesting because the accounting choice whether to capitalize seems to stem from differences in managers' assessment of the likelihood to benefit from the investment in transfer fees.
The results are weaker for operating profit and for league position, as the frequencies are
closer, yet often above, 50%. One interpretation of the smaller frequencies for operating profit than for sales is that in most cases players capture rents at the expense of their employers. That is, while investments in players are likely to increase sales, it is less likely to generate operating profits presumably due to high wages.
( Table 8 about here)
Factors Associated with Capitalizing or Expensing Transfer Fees
The results in Table 8 suggest that the association between transfer fees and future benefits is different for capitalizing companies and expensing companies. This difference motivates us to inquire why some companies capitalized and amortized net transfer fees while others expensed these costs immediately. One popular explanation is that certain companies may attempt to improve their reported profitability by capitalizing and amortizing net transfer fees instead of expensing them.
On the other hand, football clubs may be interested in showing lower profits because the tax treatment of transfer fees in the UK is most often based on reported figures. We conjecture that the tax incentive will dominate for private football clubs, whereas the need to improve reported profitability will dominate for publicly listed football clubs. Table 9 presents means and medians of selected variables for companies that expense transfer fees and for those that capitalize and amortize transfer fees. We then separate the total sample into publicly listed companies (panel A) and unlisted companies (panel B). We present (amortization of players registration -gain from selling players + players write-offs); (6) Size, measured as log of total current sales; and (7) Adjusted Leverage (ALEV), measured as total liabilities divided by total assets, where total assets exclude capitalized transfer fees.
The results in Table 9 support our conjecture. Separating publicly listed companies from unlisted companies, most capitalizing companies are listed (64 out of 89 observations). Also, 32%
of listed companies capitalize transfer fees whereas only 9% of unlisted companies do so. Second, the income effect of capitalization is significantly positive for both listed and unlisted companies.
Panel B demonstrates that unlisted clubs that capitalize are similar to expensing clubs in league position, operating profit, cash spent on player contracts and wage intensity. Examining the differences among listed companies, it is clear from panel A that expensing clubs generate, on average, cash from trading in players. In contrast, capitalizing clubs spend more cash on player acquisitions than the cash they generate from selling player contracts. Since all listed clubs generate similar operating profits from football activities, the ones that spend more on player contracts may have stronger incentive to use capitalization to increase reported profits. Indeed, capitalization increases reported income by 7% of sales, which is statistically significant at the 0.00 level.
Another possible motivation for managers in choosing capitalization as the preferred method could be related to debt levels. To the extent that the ability to raise capital is adversely affected by a high measure of indebtedness, capitalizing firms are expected to have a higher liabilities-to-assets ratio, excluding the positive impact of capitalization. However, for the entire sample, there is no significant difference in ALEV between capitalizing and expensing firms. Only for the sub-sample of listed firms significant differences are reported. However, as panel A shows, ALEV is actually higher for expensing firms than for capitalizing firms.
Recall that Table 8 demonstrates that the sales indicator is reliable for all three lags for capitalizing/listed firms but not as reliable for expensing/private companies. Table 9 suggests that the motivation for capitalization is its positive impact on reported profitability. Thus, the evidence is consistent with a story whereby a specific accounting method was chosen when (1) it satisfied managers' desire to increase reported income, and (2) it was regarded by management as sufficiently reliable.
( Table 9 about here)
Summary
This study examines the relations between investments in players' contracts and current and future company performance for a sample of 58 football clubs during 1990-00. We ask whether investment in new football players constitute assets, where assets are defined as costs associated with future sales, operating profits and league positions. We focus on UK football clubs because human capital is perhaps the only revenue driver in these companies and because the transferability of talent in these firms is regulated. In addition, accounting practice in these firms during 1990-98 had allowed both the capitalization and expensing of players' transfer fees, which makes this case a natural setting for accounting research on several aspects of this question.
We begin by analyzing the determinants of current period's investment in players. We find that current cash resources, prior year's expenditure on players and league position provide incremental explanatory power, suggesting that broad strategic considerations regarding player mix and brand name play an important role in this decision. Next, we examine the relation between sales growth and current wages, total physical assets, and current and lagged transfer fees paid for new players and transfer fees received from selling players. We find a positive association between investments in new players, i.e., transfer fees paid, and an increase in future sales. In addition, controlling for investments in new players, we find that selling players, on average, reduces future sales. We also use operating profits and league position as measures of performance. We find that investments in new players improve these future performance measures. Turning to market-based analysis, we provide evidence that suggests that investors also regard investment in player registration as an asset.
We also examine whether investing in players' contracts will result in probable future benefits. We find that the likelihood of increasing sales following an investment in players is quite high. However, the likelihood of increasing operating profits following such an investment is close to 50%. Interestingly, we find that the likelihood of a sales increase and an increase in operating profits following an investment in players is higher for companies that chose to capitalize players' transfers on their balance sheet. At least for these companies, the capitalization decision was justified given the likelihood of future benefits. Finally, we observe that publicly listed clubs tended to capitalize transfer fees, and by that increase reported income, to a much larger extent than unlisted clubs. The fact that unlisted clubs prefer expensing could be explained by tax considerations. Since such considerations were also present for publicly traded companies, this finding speaks on the impact of listing on accounting choice.
To summarize, the analysis provides some evidence supporting the notion of capitalization of human capital in the football industry. However, given the relatively short life of players' transfers and uncertainty of some future benefits, immediate expensing of these costs may not be excessively distortive. If capitalization is adopted, however, the resulting asset should be subjected to fast amortization, and/or to a policy of frequent impairment testing. Also, in some cases labor mobility may not be as restricted as in the football industry and the ability of managers to extract rent from employees may be limited. In such instances, investment in human capital, if any, would likely be very short-lived and therefore should be expensed. Finally, since transfer fees represent a unique
arrangement, an open question is how well do they proxy for investment in training and similar programs in the general case. (Depreciation + Leases) / Sales = Depreciation expenses plus lease expenses (i.e., the cost of using capital assets) divided by sales. 4. Operating Profit / Sales = Operating profit margin. 5. Net Income / Sales = Net income margin. 6. Operating Cash Flows / Sales = Cash from operations divided by sales. Notice that expensing companies include transfers in operating cash flows, whereas capitalizing companies include transfers in investing activities. 7. TFREV / Sales = Revenues from selling players' registrations divided by sales. For companies that capitalize players' registrations, this figure is taken from the cash-flow statement. For companies that expense players' registrations, this figure is taken from the income statement. 8. TFINV / Sales = Cost of players' registrations divided by sales. For companies that capitalize players' registrations, this figure is the addition to intangible assets during the period. For companies that expense players' registrations, this figure is taken from the income statement. 9. PGAIN = Revenues from transfers (TFREV) minus payments for new players' registrations (TFINV) divided by sales. Variables are defined as follows: Variables are defined as follows: Statistics for companies that capitalize and companies that expense players' transfer fees during 1991-98, a period during which companies were allowed to select one of these methods. We separate listed companies from not listed companies and provide results of t-tests and Wilcoxon signed-rank tests that no differences exist between the samples.
